As the Kurdish Studies Center, on the occasion of the first year of the new peace process that began in October 2024 and continues to this day, we are publishing analyses from a group of experts on various dimensions of the process. Through this series, we aim to meet the need of both society and policymakers for rigorous analysis by bringing different expert perspectives, field-based observations, and data into public discussion. We hope you find it a valuable read.

—

The Iraq and KRG Dimension of Turkey’s New Peace Process: Roles and Scenarios 

In Turkey, the new peace process known as “Turkey Without Terrorism”, which includes the PKK’s disarmament and dissolution as well as democratic reforms, has had an impact that has extended far beyond the confines of domestic politics and the security bureaucracy from the very outset. The process is triggering a structural transformation that affects not only Ankara’s security doctrine but also the entire Kurdish political landscape in the Middle East. The peace process is reshaping the long-standing dynamics of competition, conflict and cooperation among Kurdish actors to varying degrees, just as it is affecting Ankara’s relations with these actors. This landscape, in which Ankara’s relations with regional Kurdish geopolitics are being redefined, is pushing Kurdish politics towards a multi-polar axis characterised by competition and mutual interdependence.

Several interconnected factors are increasingly anchoring the process within the Iraq-KRG equation: the PKK’s main bases and logistics hubs are located in northern Iraq, and Turkey’s military presence on Iraqi territory has drawn persistent sovereignty claims from Baghdad. The KRG, meanwhile, remains both economically and politically dependent on Turkey while grappling with its own internal political fragmentation. The PKK’s primary bases and logistical infrastructure are located in northern Iraq, while the Iraqi government continues to raise concerns over sovereignty in response to Turkey’s military presence on its territory. At the same time, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) remains economically and politically dependent on Turkey and is constrained by its own internal political fragmentation. These dynamics are increasingly positioning Iraq and the KRG at the center of the process. Consequently, every step taken in Ankara regarding this issue carries different implications in Baghdad and, in particular, Erbil. Therefore, the success or failure of the process will generate multilayered consequences across Ankara, regional Kurdish geopolitics, Iraq, and the KRG.

Baghdad’s View of the Process in 2025

Following MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s call for PKK’s leader Öcalan  in October 2024 to address the Turkish Grand National Assembly,  a cautious sense of hope emerged among Kurds in Turkey that a decades-long conflict  might finally be resolved.  This cautious optimism can also spread to the Kurds in Iraq, as well. Between Bahçeli’s statement on Öcalan and Öcalan’s February 2025 call for the PKK to give up its arms, I had the opportunity to observe in Erbil how this cautious sense of hope had channelled itself into an optimistic direction, on both societal level and the one of political figures. In a process that began with a focus on security, the PKK’s decisions on disarmament and dissolution, along with the commission established in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, reinforced confidence in the process. However, as in Turkey, there remains a lingering concern across the region that that the process could still be reversed.

The process coincided with a period of peak political and geopolitical tension between Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). October 2024, when the process began, marked a period leading up to the elections during which both the political and economic tensions between the KRG and the Baghdad government were at their most intense, and the conflict between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) had escalated. As of today, 15 months have passed since the elections in the KRG, yet a government has still not been formed. Iraq, meanwhile, held parliamentary elections in November 2025 at a critical juncture where a new round of Iran-Israel tensions was anticipated. Given past experience, where government formation processes have taken at least seven months, negotiations in Baghdad are progressing slowly. In short, for both capitals that stand at the heart of this process, the foremost priority at present is to form their government.

While Iraq’s and the KRG’s positive statements on the process can be read as support with different nuances, Baghdad’s and Erbil’s approach should not be understood as mere general endorsement. Both actors also appear to assume facilitating and mediating roles, and it should be kept in mind that they may stand to gain from the process itself and from its possible outcomes.

Although Iraq long ignored the PKK by framing it as a problem for Ankara and Erbil, Baghdad has recently moved closer to Turkey’s position on opposing the PKK. It has even placed the organisation on its list of banned groups, arguing that the PKK also poses a problem for Iraq itself. However, while officials state that Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil maintained close coordination and shared intelligence during the PKK’s disarmament process, no details of this cooperation have been disclosed.

The Baghdad administration’s approach to the process is shaped by three key motivations vis-à-vis Ankara: an emphasis on sovereignty to ensure that Iraqi territory does not become a permanent stage for regional conflicts; the need to manage relations with Ankara within an internal balance where armed groups close to Tehran hold significant influence, without shifting those relations entirely onto a confrontational axis; and the imperative to establish a sustainable relationship with Turkey in the areas of trade, transit and energy. In this context, the anti-PKK measures recently taken by Baghdad can be interpreted not so much as direct “support’ for Ankara, but rather as a controlled facilitation of the resolution of this issue. Although declaring the PKK a “banned organisation” represents a symbolically significant step for Ankara, Baghdad appears to treat the decision less as a security measure to be fully and consistently implemented on the ground than as a political tool in its negotiations with Turkey. Over the past year, Iraqi officials have welcomed the PKK’s statements on disarmament as a positive development and adopted a position supportive of dialogue between Turkey and the PKK. However, although Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has explicitly supported the process, some actors within the government and pro-Iranian groups have repeatedly argued that Turkey’s continued military presence on Iraqi territory can no longer be justified. In particular, the decision to extend the authorisation to send troops to Iraq and Syria for a further three years from 30 October 2025 has provoked a strong reaction in Baghdad. In this regard, Iraq continues to oscillate between assertions of sovereignty and pragmatic facilitation regarding the conduct of the process.

The KRG’s Perspective on the Process in 2025

The actors across the entire political spectrum in the KRG show anopen support for the process at every opportunity, and developments are being closely followed. It is also observed that the KDP and the Barzani family are assuming a “mediator’ role, just as they did during the peace process that concluded in 2015. However, Erbil’s approach to the process is influenced by factors such as greater economic and political dependence on Turkey compared to Baghdad, political fragilities within the KRG, and the varying degrees to which the PKK is perceived as a threat. Statements by KRG officials regarding the need to prevent the process from being sabotaged stem primarily from the belief that a region free of the PKK would be to their own advantage.

Erbil has assumed a facilitating and mediating role in the process between Ankara and the PKK. Yet the process also indirectly involves Iraqi Kurds through the sharp rivalry between the KDP and the PUK within the KRG, their divergent approaches to the PKK, the KDP’s broader demand for the PKK’s withdrawal from the region, and the clashes that have taken place in the recent past. In this context, the KDP stands out as an actor that has moved beyond facilitation and mediation by restraining its confrontational policy toward the PKK and adopting a more moderate stance in support of the process. Although the KRG does not appear to hold a decision-making role on the ground, the process seems to have increased its political weight in the eyes of both Ankara and Kurdish actors.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the Sulaymaniyah-based PUK, which has historically been closer to the PKK, has recently stepped up its direct contacts with Ankara. The fact that PUK security forces facilitated the PKK’s weapons-burning ceremony on the ground, and that the event was covered not only by the organisation’s media but also by Bafel Talabani’s Channel 8 alongside Anadolu Agency (AA), marked one of the first visible signs of contact between Ankara and Sulaymaniyah as the process unfolded. Turkey has extended an olive branch to the PUK by reopening the Sulaymaniyah airspace, which it had kept closed for over two years on the grounds of PKK influence in the region. This rapprochement demonstrates that the Sulaymaniyah faction is not obliged to pursue solely an Iran-centred foreign policy. From the PUK’s perspective, the relationship established with Ankara serves as a means of both distancing itself from the PKK and expanding its sphere of international legitimacy; indeed, Sulaymaniyah appears to be one of the areas where the new peace process is having an indirect positive impact. Particularly given that Iran continues to exert influence over the PUK due to both historical ties and geographical proximity, and considering the influence of pro-Iranian forces within the Baghdad government as well as Bafel Talabani’s close relations with these actors, a complex dynamic emerges within the Tehran, Sulaymaniyah, and Ankara triangle. It is worth noting that, as the trend toward a decline in Iran’s regional influence has not yet taken hold in Iraq, the anticipated rapprochement between Ankara and Sulaymaniyah remains open to change. The possibility that the KDP, which has traditionally been closer to Turkey than the PUK, may experience a reduction in the shared perception of the “PKK threat” with Ankara could redirect the security-focused intensity of Erbil–Ankara relations toward other areas, thereby strengthening the strategic partnership between the two sides.

Consequently, for Kurdish political actors in Iraq, the process is not merely a security issue between Turkey and the PKK, but also an issue that affects the balance of power within Kurdish politics. Questions such as which Kurdish actors Ankara will engage with as primary interlocutors and whose sphere of political representation will expand are directly influencing attitudes towards the process in the Iraqi Kurdish arena, where inter-party competition can override national interests. As a result, while some Iraqi Kurdish actors are observing the process with cautious optimism, others are attempting to position themselves in anticipation of possible outcomes. This situation also explains why the KRG cannot act as a unified facilitating actor. However, as the process unfolds, the expectation of potential shared gains for Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, both in terms of specific actors and in a broader sense, is bringing the KDP and the PUK together in their support for the process.

The Process’s Impact on Relations among Kurdish Actors

Although the process has not yet been concluded, it appears that the current trajectory is beginning to influence relations between Kurdish actors, which encompass various dimensions such as division, competition, conflict, and cooperation, and to normalise them to a significant extent. It is noteworthy that the traditionally tense relations between the KDP and the PUK, where competition has traditionally been the dominant factor, have been partially positively affected by the process, while the long-standing conflict between the PKK and the KDP has been replaced by negotiations. Indeed, over the course of a year, KDP leaders Nechirvan and Masoud Barzani met with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leader Mazloum Abdi on at least three occasions. These meetings should be seen not merely as an attempt to foster dialogue among Kurds, but also as an indirect consequence of the Ankara-PKK negotiation process, with implications for Kurds in Syria and Iraq. The KDP’s expanding sphere of dialogue, which has opened up alongside the process, and its contact with Abdi, believed to have taken place with Ankara’s approval, could help to counterbalance the SDF’s ideological rigidity, break the PUK’s monopoly over Kurds linked to the PKK, transform Syrian Kurds into a more integrated actor within the regional system, and act as a mediator in SDF-Ankara talks within the framework of the process. This suggests that the future of the Syrian Kurds will depend on negotiations with Damascus, the US security umbrella, and the evolving ties with Kurdish actors such as the KDP that have emerged through the ongoing peace process.

The process had a direct impact on the Kurdish political landscape in northern Syria. The PYD–ENKS (Kurdish National Council) talks, which had been at a standstill for some time, gained fresh momentum during the initial phase of this process. In particular, the expectation that security pressure from Turkey might ease brought the parties to the negotiating table on a more pragmatic footing. However, it is important to remember that the roots of the problems between these two Kurdish actors run deep. As the PYD came to dominate the political arena, it not only left no room for political actors within the ENKS but also restricted the scope of operations for media outlets such as Rudaw. The PYD’s unwillingness to share its de facto administrative power, coupled with the ENKS’s alignment with the KDP and its exclusion from military and administrative spheres, has thwarted all previous attempts at reconciliation. At this stage, the contacts between Masoud Barzani and Mazlum Abdi proved decisive. Barzani’s urging for the recognition of the ENKS’s political presence and the strengthening of intra-Kurdish legitimacy compelled Abdi to show some flexibility, albeit limited. It is important to note that these talks have fostered a temporary rapprochement that also aligns with the PYD’s quest for international legitimacy. Indeed, during Mazlum Abdi’s meeting with Masoud Barzani in Duhok in December 2025, Ibrahim Biro was present at the table on behalf of the ENKS. This meeting addressed the revival of the PYD-ENKS dialogue and the strengthening of internal Kurdish political legitimacy. However, as the nature of the relationship between the two actors runs parallel to the course of the process, it is directly affected by every development, whether positive or negative. From this perspective, it appears that the relationship will not be able to settle on a stable footing until the ENKS is recognised as a genuine political partner within the administrative structure controlled by the PYD. Such a partnership would not only strengthen the KDP-PYD rapprochement but also create a scenario that would alleviate Ankara’s concerns, given that the Barzani faction is set to gain ground in Syria.

The Ankara-PKK talks are creating a new, necessary realism for Kurdish actors that goes beyond ideological slogans. The new peace process, which is set to shape Turkey’s Kurdish geopolitics, may also shift the relationship between Ankara and Kurdish actors affiliated with or sympathetic to the PKK away from a stance of absolute opposition, towards a balance of engagement, negotiation and potential shared interests. Indeed, Mazlum Abdi’s closer ties with the KDP, the PUK’s increased contacts with Ankara, and the fact that politics in the KRG is being influenced to a certain extent by the process, all signal a shift in Kurdish politics from conflict-driven relations towards normalisation as the process unfolds. This new phase heralds a period in which Kurdish actors are compelled to redefine not only their relations with Ankara but also their relations with one another. It appears that, in the coming years, the main determinant of Kurdish geopolitics will not be ideological alignments, but rather how this normalisation is managed and by whom. However, the existence of historical divisions and rivalries based on parties, leaders and tribes within Kurdish geopolitics does not mean that the phase of normalisation achieved by Kurdish geopolitics in the new peace process will not be put to the test.

Opportunities and Risks for Iraq and the KRG

Although the process between Ankara and the PKK has faced criticism for its slow progress, there is a strong belief that it will not break down. However, as with any peace process, whether successful or not, it is inevitable that opportunities and risks will arise for the parties involved.

A successful outcome to the process will, first and foremost, produce a result that strengthens Baghdad’s narrative of sovereignty. Limiting or gradually withdrawing the PKK’s armed presence in northern Iraq will enable the Baghdad government to defend more forcefully its long-disputed claim to “control over Iraqi territory’. This situation will enhance Baghdad’s capacity to convey the message to both its domestic public and regional actors that “Iraq is not a theatre for the security issues of neighbouring countries”.

At the same time, the success of the process could pave the way for the security dimension of Turkey-Iraq relations to be placed on a more institutional footing. Issues such as border security, joint mechanisms and intelligence sharing will move away from a crisis management approach and settle into a more predictable framework. This will allow the effort and energy previously devoted to security matters in Baghdad’s relations with Ankara to be channelled into areas such as trade and transport. Particularly in light of the ongoing massive scale of a project such as the Development Corridor, it is important that divisions between the parties are reduced. Another positive effect will be seen in Baghdad’s perception of its regional role. The success of the process will make it possible for Iraq to be referred to as a “facilitating actor’. This also aligns with the image of a “balancing regional actor’ that Iraqi diplomacy has been seeking in recent years.

Of course, the success of the process may not always yield predictable results. One of the most significant risks for Iraq is the power gaps that may arise on the ground following the PKK’s withdrawal or reduction of its armed presence. Consequently, given that the Peshmerga have moved into areas previously held by the PKK, it can be assessed that in such a scenario, the KDP and the PUK would fill the gaps and consolidate their own spheres of influence. Against the backdrop of a successful process in which the PKK has withdrawn completely from Iraq, the permanent establishment of Turkey’s military presence in Iraq could heighten the reactions of Iraqi militias and politicians aligned with Iran who oppose the Turkish Armed Forces’ presence. This situation could limit the gains in sovereignty that Baghdad had anticipated and make the process politically costly for Iraq. On the other hand, at a time when the US and coalition forces are considering a withdrawal from the country, there is a possibility that Turkey may continue to maintain its bases and military presence, a significant proportion of which are currently within the KDP’s sphere of influence, with Erbil’s approval in order to act as a counterbalance to Iranian pressure and influence. However, although it is anticipated that the continued US military presence in Iraq will mean that Turkish troops will not be a priority for Iran-backed forces, it is inevitable that this situation will become one of the areas of tension that Tehran will exploit in Ankara-Baghdad relations.

For the KRG, the successful conclusion of the process primarily means stability and predictability. The end of the PKK’s presence will alleviate the impact of the conflicts the KRG has long faced. The KDP views the PKK’s presence in the KRG as a threat and a violation of its sovereignty, noting that the organisation has targeted civilians and security forces within the KRG. Despite the KDP’s military cooperation against the PKK, KRG officials also emphasise the negative effects of the conflicts. While it is expected that the areas in the KRG from which the PKK is to withdraw will be filled by KDP and PUK peshmerga, the return of civilians to these areas could produce a result that strengthens the KRG’s internal sovereignty. Consequently, the KRG stands to gain full sovereignty over territories currently under PKK control. The restoration of access for residents to villages currently occupied by the PKK is likely to further boost public support for the KDP, which is known within the KRG for its clear stance against the organisation.

From an economic perspective, greater stability would make the KRG’s trade relations with Turkey more sustainable. Uncertainty regarding border crossings, logistics routes and energy flows may diminish. This situation could provide the Erbil administration with some breathing space, albeit limited, both domestically and in the eyes of international investors. On the political front, should the process prove successful, the KRG may find an opportunity to position itself as a “Kurdish actor prioritising solutions over conflict”. This carries symbolic significance, particularly in Erbil’s relations with international actors. Furthermore, given the possibility of a limited Turkish military presence in the KRG to counter Iranian aggression, this could lead to Turkey reacting less strongly to the KRG’s pursuit of greater autonomy within Iraq. Furthermore, the KDP’s ability to reach out more easily to its Kurdish supporters in Turkey strengthens Barzani’s hand in his rivalry with Öcalan. Increased and sustained Turkish support for the KDP in Syria, aimed at counterbalancing groups linked to Öcalan, could also feature among the notable outcomes.

Should the process come to a standstill, however, a situation will arise in which all parties will be affected. Iraq argues that the PKK issue must be resolved, citing the recent sovereignty disputes sparked by Turkey’s operations against the PKK and the Development Corridor project. Failure would, for Iraq, primarily mean a resurgence of security risks. An increase in Turkey’s cross-border military activities would intensify the sovereignty disputes between Baghdad and Ankara. The Baghdad administration could become the focus of criticism for failing to maintain control on the ground and for remaining ineffective on the diplomatic front, particularly in the face of pro-Iranian forces. In this scenario, not only will Baghdad’s claim to act as a facilitator rapidly erode, but it will also become inevitable for Iraq, under Iranian influence, to bring forward the issue of sovereignty violations against Turkey. In this context, the unresolved issues in the disarmament process, namely the future of the Mahmur Camp and the Sinjar issue, appear set to remain the most contentious matters between the parties.

The failure of the process represents the worst-case scenario for the KRG compared to Iraq. An escalation of military tensions could lead to the risk of KRG territory once again becoming a major theatre of conflict. In such a scenario, the Erbil administration would be unable to achieve the manoeuvre room it desires, due both to Ankara’s military pressure on the organisation and the PKK’s presence on the ground. Economically, this scenario could also have serious consequences for the KRG. Increased security risks would not only adversely affect trade and investment channels but could also deepen internal political instability.

Another negative possibility is that, should this process fail, the trend towards normalisation between Kurdish actors, one of the process’s benefits, could give way to renewed tensions. The resumption of clashes between the PKK and the KDP in the KRG, the organisation’s desire to instrumentalise the rivalry between the KDP and the PUK, and the possibility that this could negatively impact the already historically contentious and conflict-ridden relations between the KDP and the PUK are all potential concerns. Furthermore, should the process fail, the PUK’s continued relations with the PKK could bring Ankara-Sulaymaniyah relations to the brink of a breakdown.

In conclusion, although the roles of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Turkey’s process with the PKK are not decisive, they stand out for their “facilitating’ and “mediating’ functions. Rather than being actors who directly steer the process, Baghdad and Erbil are in the position of facilitators who can make conditions on the ground less fragile. However, the sustainability of this facilitation depends not only on political will but also on security capacity, the management of internal balances, and the equilibrium to be established with regard to the Syrian dossier.

Furthermore, although Iran’s regional influence has waned following the Israeli and US attacks after 7 October, it remains one of the key players capable of influencing the course of the new peace process. The process involving the PKK is a source of concern for Iran, even if this is not explicitly stated. While Iran has managed the Kurdish issue through an absolute security paradigm to date, Ankara’s efforts to create room for dialogue are increasing the risk of regional confrontation for Tehran. Conversely, there is both regional pressure on Iran and a growing anger directed at the regime from within. The increasingly harsh statements by US officials at every opportunity regarding the need to erode Iranian influence in Iraq, coupled with Israel’s open threats, appear set to prolong Tehran’s process of turning inwards. In particular, the lawlessness of the US’s actions in Venezuela, which knows no bounds in international geopolitics, may also deter Iran from opening new fronts. This reluctance could not only facilitate the weakening of its sphere of influence in Iraq but also alleviate potential obstacles to the process.

On the other hand, whilst discussing the Iraqi aspect of the process, it is impossible to set aside the Syrian dimension. Even if success is achieved in disarming or withdrawing the PKK from Iraq, the uncertainties in Syria will keep Turkey’s security reflexes on high alert. This situation highlights that the process will remain fragile unless it is addressed as a regional whole. Should a process advancing in Iraq become stalled in Syria, as was the case in the previous peace process, Ankara’s security priorities may harden once again. Such a scenario could mean that both Baghdad and Erbil are affected not only by the positive trajectory of the process but also by any potential obstacles. Although the outcome may appear bleak, Ankara, Baghdad and Erbil are acting with the awareness that, in the new geopolitical landscape the region is navigating, stability and security must exist not only internally but also in neighbouring countries. From this perspective, even when tensions occasionally escalate, Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil appear to avoid steps that could undermine the success of the process. Its failure would serve no actor’s interests.

/// Note: The analyses published on KSC’s website reflect the authors’ own views. These views are not necessarily aligned with KSC’s institutional approach.

Mehmet Alaca is an expert specialising in Iraq, regional Kurdish politics and Shia militias in the Middle East. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the Department of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Istanbul University, and a master’s degree from the Department of Politics and International Relations of the Middle East at the University of Exeter in the UK. His work has been published in numerous national and international publications.