As the Kurdish Studies Center, on the occasion of the first year of the new peace process that began in October 2024 and continues to this day, we are publishing analyses from a group of experts on various dimensions of the process. Through this series, we aim to meet the need of both society and policymakers for rigorous analysis by bringing different expert perspectives, field-based observations, and data into public discussion. We hope you find it a valuable read.

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In the First Year of the Process: Global Transformation, Regional Risks, and Security / Kadir Temiz

The international system has largely lost the institutional stability and governance capacity that we have been accustomed to since the Second World War. In addition, while the normative and institutional architecture of the post-Cold War era is eroding, it remains unclear what will replace this structure. Rather than defining today’s landscape as a “new order,” it seems more accurate to conceptualize it, as frequently seen in literature, as a transitional phase between the unraveling of the old order and the failure to yet establish a new one.

Such transitional periods are not merely timeframes in which the global balance of power, economic relations, and institutional structures are reorganized. They are also periods in which security, threat perceptions, and states’ survival strategies are redefined. In an environment where great power competition intensifies, mid-sized actors try to expand their room for maneuver, and regional crises intertwine with global competition, security can no longer be explained solely by military capacity. The cornerstone variables of the new era, such as technology, big data, artificial intelligence, and digitalization, have neither been fully understood nor have their potential new security threats been defined.

Precisely for this reason, reading current developments in the Middle East solely through dichotomous, dead-end cycles such as “conflict-non-conflict; resolution-irresolution; war-peace” remains insufficient. The fading of the conflict with the PKK in Turkey, the dissolution of the organization and the laying down of arms, debates over post-conflict reconstruction in Syria, Israel’s regionally destabilizing policies, and the new position Turkey has assumed within this picture are all parts of a broader transformation.

This article addresses the aforementioned transformation through a three-level analytical framework. The transition of the order at the global level, trends toward state-formation and centralization at the regional level, and the redefinition of domestic security through development form the conceptual backbone of the text. This framework will be treated not merely as a theoretical abstraction, but as an analytical tool that directly corresponds with developments on the ground.

1. Global Order Change: Great Power Competition and Mid-Sized Actors

Today, the most prominent feature of global politics is that uncertainty has become permanent. The US–China rivalry, Russia’s revisionist moves, and Europe’s strategic directionlessness do not produce a power vacuum at the center of the international system; on the contrary, they produce a fragmented order. Thus, the classical characteristics of transitional periods have become visible once again. While great powers avoid direct conflict, they shift their competition to technology, new trade networks, and regional arenas. Instead of total dependence, middle powers turn toward strategies of autonomy, risk aversion, and balancing.

For this reason, while the capacity for risk-taking decreases, behaviors of caution and gradual adaptation come to the fore. However, this cautious attitude of the actors remains insufficient to eliminate the uncertainty created by the aforementioned fragmented order, and it also harbors serious security and conflict risks at the systemic level.

For actors like Turkey, whose military, economic, and diplomatic capacity is above a certain threshold, this environment is neither a pure era of opportunities nor an inevitable period of crisis. The real issue is determining in which areas risk will be reduced and in which areas initiative will be taken within this environment of uncertainty. Therefore, explaining regional dynamics solely through the interventions of great powers brings the risk of overlooking local and regional transformations.

2. Regional Order Transformation: A Trend Toward Centralization and State-Formation

For many years, the Middle East was known as a region where state authorities weakened, borders became transparent, and non-state armed actors became primary elements of the system. However, in recent years, this picture has begun to reverse.

Today, many actors in the region respond to the global environment of uncertainty with a two-direction strategy. The first is the effort to increase state capacity and strengthen central authority. This is pursued with a determination to either integrate non-state actors into the system or eliminate them. The second is to sustain the centralizing political will alongside individual and social transformation by establishing an existential relationship between security and economy through an exploration for an economic development model. Thus, an irreversible relationship of mutual interest and trust is built by constructing the security-economy nexus as a new model, which previous conflict resolution models have failed to establish.

Among the developments that can be mentioned as concrete indicators of the first strategy are the central government’s quest to regain power in Iraq, debates on the transition from a fragmented structure to controlled integration in Syria, the return of the idea of the state to the agenda in Lebanon and Yemen, and the debate over the disarmament of non-state actors. These developments show that the concepts of “state-formation” and “centralization” are regaining legitimacy in the regional system.

The second strategy centers on a belief that political and social order, which has long been produced by failed economic development models in the Middle East, can move forward on a positive course within the 21st century’s unique economic transformation. The fact that almost every country is searching for alternative economic diversification models with various vision proposals regarding the “post-oil” era debates in the Gulf countries, the alternative resources emerging with China’s economic rise, the connectivity projects that technological transformation can provide, and the debates on a new production and consumption model moving in coordination with these are all being vividly discussed in the region.

For Turkey, this transformation has a highly decisive significance in terms of its priorities in the region. The problems caused by the fragmented structure in Syria are directly linked to Turkey’s domestic security, economic capacity, and regional integration vision. This same prioritized situation applies to Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf as well. In short, serious political economy restructuring processes in the region, ranging from the Gulf to the Red Sea, and from East Africa to the changing geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, carry an existential importance for Turkey.

3. Transformation of the Local Order: The Hybrid Transformation of Security and Development

The third level of analysis relates to how security is defined. In recent years, a strong awareness has emerged not only in Turkey but also across the region that treating security in a manner restricted to military methods is unsustainable. Even in an environment where armed threats have not completely disappeared, the understanding that these threats can be faded out through economic development, public services, and governance capacity is gaining strength. Security is no longer just about protecting borders, it is also about generating prosperity, increasing integration, and managing societal expectations.

Although the fact that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition won the most votes in the recent Iraqi elections is balanced by the increased influence of militia forces in parliament, it can still be read as a clear message from Iraqi society regarding the security-development relationship. Likewise, Syria has gone through very severe challenges in the period since December 8, 2024. In the short term, social and political will in Syria has made a choice that prioritizes lifting sanctions and gaining international legitimacy through a development- and prosperity-oriented strategy in a reconstruction process that prioritizes Syria’s security problems. This goal has been achieved, if only partially. However, for comprehensive success, not only the local order but also the regional and international orders must move along a similar line.

The security relationship that Turkey has entered into with both of its neighbors in recent years is also transforming within this framework. The unsustainable nature of internal instability, security, and development problems in both Iraq and Syria has forced Turkey to develop its relations with both neighbors around a more realistic model. Within this framework, particularly in the context of Turkey’s strategy against the PKK, the “Terror-Free Turkey and Terror-Free Region” goal, set out toward ending the armed conflict, is one of the most concrete examples of this transformation. This process is not merely a matter of security; it is at the same time a matter of development and political normalization.

The US and the Middle East

The US’s current position in the Middle East indicates a redefinition of its form of engagement, rather than a withdrawal as is frequently expressed. For the US, the issue is not completely leaving the region; it is limiting the strategic cost of the Middle East under conditions of increasing global competition and handing over the burden as much as possible to regional actors instead of directly intervening. While competition with China, the Indo-Pacific line, and European security stand out among the US’s priorities, the Middle East is treated more as a risk area that needs to be managed. This approach brings with it keeping crises under control rather than resolving them, and using flexible and indirect balancing mechanisms instead of high-cost military engagements.

Within this framework, the US’s view of Turkey is also transforming markedly. For the US, Turkey is no longer positioned as a “problem-free ally” at the center of normative alignment expectations; instead, it is positioned as an actor that is hard to dispense with due to its capacity to produce regional balance. Turkey’s ability to engage simultaneously with Russia, Iran, the Gulf states, and Europe aligns with the US’s limited engagement strategy in the Middle East. This situation is causing the classical language of alliance to give way to a more flexible relationship based on mutual tolerance and functionality. This new form of relations reflects a pragmatic understanding of balance that aims not at the complete elimination of crises, but at keeping them at a manageable level.

The Fading of Armed Conflict along the Turkey–Syria Line: From Security to Politics, From Politics to Integration

The end of armed conflict inside Turkey and, parallel to this, the emerging trend toward integration in the Syrian theater should not be read merely as a tactical security move. This development indicates a transformation in Turkey’s security architecture that has been shaped over the last thirty years. This is because, for a long time, armed conflict generated a decisive weight on Turkey’s domestic politics, foreign policy, and regional engagements; this situation tied up a significant portion of state capacity within a security-centered framework.

Today, with the winding down of the conflict, this deadlock is gradually beginning to give way. This does not merely mean a reduction in security expenditures or a drop in military risks. More importantly, it means that Turkey’s political and economic capacity can once again be reinforced by the security architecture.

Redefining Internal Stability

The end of armed conflict brings with it a rethinking of the concept of internal stability. For many years, internal stability was largely equated with the suppression of the security threat. However, with the fading of the conflict, stability transforms into a concept more related to political representation, economic integration, and the management of societal expectations.

This situation constitutes a critical threshold in terms of handling the Kurdish issue through non-security tools. While the expansion of the political and social sphere remains limited in an environment where security is provided by military methods, the reduction of conflict allows different policy tools to come into play. In this context, the issue can be viewed not as a matter of simple optimism that “the threat has disappeared,” but rather as a change in the way the threat is managed.

Normalization and Predictability in the Syrian Field

The fading of the conflict along the Turkey–Syria line makes it possible for border security to settle into a more predictable framework. The Syrian field, which for a long time was shaped through uncertainty, transience, and fragmented authorities, generated a continuous risk area for Turkey. The steps taken toward integration, however, are gradually transforming this risk area into a manageable area.

This transformation shows its impact across a wide spectrum, ranging from the issue of returns to trade and logistics lines. The grounding of returns on a rational basis is not only a humanitarian issue, but is simultaneously a decisive element in terms of social cohesion, public services, and economic planning. Similarly, border trade and regional transportation lines regaining functionality carries the potential to bring Turkey’s southern corridors into a more holistic structure with Iraq, the Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Syria becoming relatively stable directly affects the diplomatic processes that Turkey carries out with regional and global actors as well. While security-based friction areas with the US are narrowing, the tone of Middle East-centered topics with Russia is shifting; in relations with the Gulf countries and Europe, more areas for cooperation are opening up. Thus, in the new form of relations it develops with the actors it engages with in the region, Turkey is attempting to establish the connection between economy and security by defining its role as a security-providing actor in a broader spectrum.

The point to be noted here is that the increase in Turkey’s diplomatic maneuver capacity becomes possible through the reduction of risks, rather than the direct use of military force. In other words, Turkey’s strengthening is related not only to its capacity to “be able to use more power,” but also to its opportunity to “be able to act with less risk.”

Israel’s Order-Disrupting Role and Turkey’s Balancing Position

In the regional equation, the policies pursued by Israel in the recent period possess an instability-generating character. This situation is not limited solely to the Palestinian issue. The rising tension along the Israel–Iran line, security risks in the Eastern Mediterranean, and pressures on regional energy lines create a broader area of vulnerability.

Within this framework, Turkey’s position stands out in three fundamental dimensions. In an environment where the Israel–Iran tension escalates, Turkey, with its structure of not fully engaging with any axis, assumes a balancing role. This position of Turkey is not neutrality; it is a result of an autonomous balancing strategy. Ankara increases its capacity to produce stability through its steps aimed at lowering regional tension.

The fact that Turkey is one of the rare actors that can talk simultaneously with Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Europe strengthens its potential to be a diplomatic channel during moments of crisis. This situation makes Turkey not merely a side, but a mediating actor in crisis management.

If regional crises deepen, Turkey’s role would not remain limited solely to crisis management. In areas such as post-Gaza reconstruction, Eastern Mediterranean security, and regional energy flows, Turkey’s order-building capacity becomes more visible. This capacity is shaped through its ability to generate stability, rather than military power.

Negative Scenario: The Rupture of the Transition Phase and the Return of the Security Cycle

Just as the current transition phase progressing in a positive direction must be considered, the possibility of this process failing must also be handled with analytical seriousness. This is because transition periods are simultaneously the times when vulnerabilities are at their highest. If a scenario emerges where the dissolution of the PKK with all its elements cannot be completed, integration in Syria is disrupted, and the northern line becomes open to fragmented and armed actors once again, this situation would mean a multidimensional strategic regression.

In such a scenario, the first and most apparent risk is the reactivation of the security cycle. Turkey would have to manage risks once again that it had brought under control over many years by paying significant costs. This is not merely a military and financial burden, it simultaneously means that political energy would squeeze back onto a security axis. However, it should also not be forgotten that Turkey’s experience in countering terrorism and its rapid identification of predictable risk areas mean a security-prioritized strategic positioning is one of Turkey’s most fundamental advantages.

The second dimension of the negative scenario is the return of Turkey’s strategic agenda to internal and external terror threats and border security. Under normal conditions, the capacity expected to turn toward economic expansion, regional integration, and infrastructure projects would refocus on security topics. This situation means an uncertain regional order once again, not only for Turkey but for all regional actors. Turkey’s experience in managing security problems arising from instability in its nearby geographies could lead to a more active and constructive impact in such a scenario. At this point, the issue is the risk of security becoming the sole determining agenda item. This is because this situation narrows Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy and development vision.

The third and perhaps most critical dimension of the negative scenario is that regional policies become open to great power competition once again. The regional position of the US, Russia’s calculations in Syria, Iran’s networks, and Europe’s security anxieties intersect within the same equation once more. In this case, the autonomous room for maneuver of regional actors narrows, and actors may be forced to take up positions within the competition agendas of others rather than their own priorities. Therefore, this scenario could also mean a loss of strategic autonomy for Turkey.

Structural Transformation in Turkey’s Security Perspective: From Military Security to Holistic Stability

When the developments discussed above are evaluated together, Turkey’s understanding of security is undergoing a qualitative, not quantitative, transformation. This transformation does not mean that security is completely divested of military tools. On the contrary, military capacity is still accepted as necessary and functional; however, the reality that security can no longer be sustained by this capacity alone is becoming increasingly apparent.

In this context, the transformation in Turkey’s security perspective materializes along three fundamental axes.

First axis, is the inversion of the relationship that security establishes with development. For many years, development had been treated as an outcome dependent upon the ensuring of security. Today, however, development is becoming a field in which security itself is produced. Economic integration, infrastructure projects, trade lines, and employment generation have ceased to be secondary elements supporting security and have instead become the essential components of security.

The economic and logistics projects taking shape along the Turkey–Iraq–Syria–Gulf line constitute the practical outcomes of this transformation. These projects do not merely generate economic value; they simultaneously establish a ground that reduces conflict risks, creates mutual interdependence, and promotes stability.

Second axis is the handling of security as a holistic concept. Energy security, food security, supply chains, digital infrastructures, and diplomatic capacity have now become elements as decisive as military security. This situation removes security from being the responsibility of a single institution or a single policy area.

Turkey’s recently pursued policy line points to an approach that handles security together with its military, economic, and diplomatic dimensions. Rather than responding to crises reactively, this approach generates an preventive stability strategy aimed at blocking the emergence of crises.

Third axis is that regional integration has become not a complementary, but a foundational element of security. Economic lines centered on Iraq and Syria, commercial relations developed with the Gulf, and initiatives toward the energy equation in the Eastern Mediterranean demonstrate that Turkey defines security not solely through border defense, but through regional connectivity.

Conclusion: The Capacity to Produce Stability in Transition Periods and Turkey’s Position

The three-level analytical framework discussed in this article offers a powerful reading to understand the security, foreign policy, and regional integration debates Turkey faces today. At the global level, the uncertainty created by the order transition is met by regional-level tendencies toward state-building and centralization; at the domestic level, it is redefined through security, development, and governance.

The tendency emerging in Turkey toward the ending of armed conflict, when combined with the searches for integration and state-building in the Syrian theater, expresses a process that not only reduces Turkey’s security risks but also liberates its strategic capacity. This process strengthens Turkey’s domestic stability, expands its regional diplomatic arena, and offers Ankara a more autonomous room for maneuver.

Conversely, the realization of the negative scenario carries the risk of dragging Turkey back into a high-cost security cycle. In such a case, not only would military and economic costs increase, but the strategic gains Turkey could achieve during the global transition period would also be significantly limited.

On the other hand, Israel playing a destabilizing role on the regional level makes Turkey’s balancing, mediating, and post-crisis order-building capacity more visible.

Consequently, Turkey handles security in the current global and regional transition period not as a narrowly defined military matter, but as a multi-layered process intertwined with development, integration, and diplomacy. This approach positions Turkey not merely as an actor managing risks, but as an actor capable of producing stability on a regional level and possessing an order-building capacity.

The continuation, support, and institutionalization of the processes being discussed today emerge before us as a strategic necessity in terms of Turkey’s long-term security and regional role.

/// Note: The analyses published on KSC’s website reflect the authors’ own views. These views are not necessarily aligned with KSC’s institutional approach.

Kadir Temiz is an international relations academic specializing in Chinese foreign policy, modern Chinese history, and Turkey-China relations. Serving as faculty at the Political Science Faculty International Relations Department of Istanbul Medeniyet University, Temiz is president of the Middle East Research Center (ORSAM). His analyses on China’s Middle East policy, the Belt and Road Initiative, and Turkey-China relations appear in the reports of various think tanks and various media outlets.