As the Kurdish Studies Center, on the occasion of the first year of the new peace process that began in October 2024 and continues to this day, we are publishing analyses from a group of experts on various dimensions of the process. Through this series, we aim to meet the need of both society and policymakers for rigorous analysis by bringing different expert perspectives, field-based observations, and data into public discussion. We hope you find it a valuable read.

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The First Year of the Process: The Legal Reforms Ahead

Following the collapse of the 2013-2015 solution process, Turkey entered a harsh and turbulent period. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) “trench” strategy moved violence and clashes into city centers. As the state intensified military operations against the PKK both inside and beyond its borders, it also exerted heavy pressure on the political sphere. Though the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) had played a crucial role in the process, after the collapse of the peace process, the party faced both de facto and judicial persecution.

When a military coup attempt in 2016 was added on top of the breakdown of the solution process , legal and democratic mechanisms in Turkey suffered profound capacity loss. Grounds for freedom shrank, the principle of legal security became defunct, and even routine political demands began being used as the basis for serious charges. Opportunities for discussing the Kurdish issue in public space were restricted; the problem was once again as in 1990s re-coded as merely a “terror” and “security” issue and addressed within this framework.

At the opening session of Parliament’s new legislative term on October 1, 2024, MHP (Nationalist Action Party) leader Devlet Bahçeli’s approach toward the DEM Party benches and his handshake with the party’s leaders was, in this context, an extremely surprising move. Initially, because it was considered to be a personal gesture by Bahçeli, little significance was attributed to this action; yet over time it became clear that this was the first sign of a political shift. Hence, week after week, Bahçeli kept raising his hand, paving the way for a process to unfold.

Fifteen months have elapsed since Bahçeli’s initial move. Over this period, the process traversed several critical milestones on the path toward resolution:

• Öcalan met with family members in October 2024 and with Peoples’ Democratic Party (DEM) parliamentarians in December 2024.
• In February 2025, Öcalan called on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to lay down arms and dissolve itself.
• In May 2025, the PKK announced that it had laid down arms in response to Öcalan’s call and had dissolved itself.
• In July 2025, the PKK held a “weapon burning” ceremony in Sulaymaniyah, which drew extensive media coverage in Turkey.
• In August 2025, a “National Solidarity, Brotherhood, and Democracy Commission” was established in Parliament.
• In October 2025, the PKK announced its withdrawal from Turkey.
• In November 2025, the PKK announced its withdrawal from the Zap Region.
• In November 2025, three members of the Parliament Commission (Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s Hüseyin Yayman, DEM’s Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit, and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)’s Feti Yıldız) met with Öcalan in İmralı.
• In December 2025, a summary of minutes from the meeting with Öcalan was presented to the Parliament Commission and released to the public.

It must be acknowledged that, both when compared with resolution processes in other regions of the world and given the level of political and democratic regression the country has experienced over the past decade, significant ground has been covered in Turkey in a single year. Political actors took initiative and managed to ignite and maintain a process; they have succeeded in this. Now the process must proceed to a higher phase, namely to the phase that entails the implementation of legal arrangements.

From this juncture onward, the process can only proceed through juridical mechanisms. Admittedly, the PKK has dissolved itself, yet law shall determine the disposition of PKK members. Arms have been relinquished, yet law shall establish the manner on what conditions those who laid down arms will return to their homes and the means through which they shall be integrated into social life. Consequently, establishing a legal framework for this process has become an unavoidable necessity.. Legal arrangements may accordingly be addressed at three distinct levels:

The first level comprises arrangements that assume urgency. The intent here is to establish legislation that enables the PKK to lay down arms, facilitates the return of its members to their homes, and ensures their incorporation into social life. This arrangement, also termed “Transitional Law,” must embody certain characteristics:

• It must be drafted with a holistic perspective.
• It must be oriented toward an explicit and measurable objective.
• The legislation must clearly delineate the groups it encompasses, and in doing so, must exercise care to ensure that no one is excluded.
• The law may be formulated in two ways:
  • It may take the form of broad and unconditional amnesty.
  • Should conditions not permit this, it may provide for graduated arrangements.
• The duration of measures introduced by the law must not be protracted.
• The law must be implemented for a specified period.
• It must establish support mechanisms to address the needs of those who have laid down arms in domains such as education, health, employment, and similar areas.
• To monitor the implementation of the law—should such necessity arise—a commission may be constituted within Parliament.

The second level comprises legal practices that shall augment the consolidation of the process. The most valuable endeavor in enhancing consent for a resolution process is to awaken in the populace the sentiment that the process touches the lives of diverse segments of society in a beneficent manner. Should individuals perceive concrete ameliorations in their own circumstances and believe the process serves the general welfare, social acceptance of the process shall be considerably facilitated. Within this framework, the requisite measures are:

• The fulfillment of the requirements mandated by European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Constitutional Court (CC) decisions,
• The restoration of elected mayors whose municipalities were placed under state administration to their offices,
• The release of infirm detainees and convicted persons,
• The prevention of arbitrary and unlawful conduct by prison administrations (the obstruction of individuals’ access to conditional release rights and the rejection of requests for transfer to open prisons),
• The expeditious conclusion, within the shortest feasible timeframe, of ongoing investigations and prosecutions concerning municipal mayors,

Should these measures, which necessitate neither legislative nor constitutional amendment but rather political will and determination, be undertaken, the grounds for certain segments’ objections to the process shall be eliminated, and the conviction that the process redounds to the benefit of the entire society shall gain considerable force.

The third level comprises legal arrangements to be undertaken to resolve issues engendering conflict and thereby render societal stability permanent. Work at this level may be addressed within two distinct contexts.

The first context concerns the resolution of legal problems affecting Turkey in its entirety. Certain provisions of legislation currently in force in the country (Counter-Terrorism Law, Penal Code; Execution Law, Code of Criminal Procedure, Law on Municipalities, Electoral Law, Law on Political Parties, and likewise provisions concerning Life Imprisonment and Emergency Decrees, along with the circumstances of those effectively condemned to civil death) adversely impact the lives of all citizens. Legal standards lagging behind the contemporary age render individuals vulnerable to violations of fundamental rights and lower the threshold of freedoms.

The second context concerns those measures that must necessarily be undertaken specific to the Kurdish issue. Processes of this nature worldwide are fashioned around analogous demands. Essentially, three demands may be identified:

• The first is the restructuring of the administrative system and the redistribution of power.
• The second is the recognition and preservation of rights and freedoms (particularly cultural and ethnic identity rights).
• The third is the sharing of material and immaterial sources of authority.

In the Kurdish issue as well, setting aside the matter of disarmament, we observe that demands are configured within this framework. Three salient demands emerge:

• The first is the recognition of cultural rights, foremost among which is mother-tongue education.
• The second is the practical and de facto realization of an inclusive and egalitarian constitutional conception of citizenship in place of the current exclusionary and hierarchical understanding.
• The third is a more robust decentralized administrative structure grounded upon the devolution of power from center to periphery.

It may be contended that the resolution shall be constructed in the long term through legislative and constitutional amendments that respond to these demands. Whilst its primary objective is to strengthen Kurds’ sense of belonging to the state, it may be asserted that arrangements undertaken toward this end shall have beneficial consequences for the living standards of all citizens.

The Kurdish issue is a matter that determines the character of the regime. It possesses significance that shall directly establish the country’s juridical, political, economic, and diplomatic criteria and boundaries. In resolving this issue , which approaches a century and a half in duration, two considerations warrant emphasis:

The first is that, by virtue of its importance, the successful resolution of this matter shall necessitate substantive legal transformation. Law in Turkey must be harnessed to the service of societal peace. On the one hand, it must generate democratic responses to the problems and demands of broad societal segments; on the other, it must specifically liquidate the conditions that engendered the conflict and purge the sediment of that conflict.

Surely, this shall require time and shall necessitate a substantial political and juridical struggle spanning a minimum of 3-5 years. We must conduct ourselves with patience, constructiveness, and meticulous care, and remain steadfast in pursuit of the reasonable. The second is that processes proceeding along a fault line invariably harbor serious perils. For rigid judgments, fixed structures, widespread apprehensions, and discriminations to be preserved constitute determining factors in these processes. Politics must assume responsibility in such processes. Political parties must serve as bearers of democratic demands and must chart a course for society. To employ the substantial opportunity before us judiciously, political actors must be prepared, when necessity dictates, to assume risks and transcend conventional wisdom.

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/// Note: The analyses published on KSC’s website reflect the authors’ own views. These views are not necessarily aligned with KSC’s institutional approach.

Vahap Coşkun is an academic specializing in the Kurdish question, human rights, and Turkish political affairs. A faculty member at the Faculty of Law at Dicle University, Coşkun served as a member of the 63-person “Wise People” committee constituted within the framework of the resolution process that took place between 2013-2015. His analyses concerning the Kurdish question and, prominently, Turkey’s substantive issues are disseminated across diverse publications and media platforms.