As the Kurdish Studies Center, on the occasion of the first year of the new peace process that began in October 2024 and continues to this day, we are publishing analyses from a group of experts on various dimensions of the process. Through this series, we aim to meet the need of both society and policymakers for rigorous analysis by bringing different expert perspectives, field-based observations, and data into public discussion. We hope you find it a valuable read.

—

From Freedom to the Age of Security: Turkey and Kurds in Global (Dis)order / Serhun Al

World politics is passing through an age of uncertainty in which not only power balances, but also customary norms, rules, and identities are unraveling. We are experiencing a period in which individual and collective freedoms are diminishing while rhetoric about “national security” and militarization is proliferating. The narrative of stability, democracy, and prosperity that the liberal world order promised after the Cold War finds itself in serious decline today. The weakening of US hegemony, the deepening normative and political crises of the European Union, the rising geopolitical claims of China and Russia, and war fears between Iran, the US, and Israel are rendering the international system increasingly fragmented and unpredictable. This picture, while keeping discussions alive about whether the world will evolve toward a bipolar structure or a multi-centric distribution of power, also provides strong clues as to why democracies are globally retreating. Rhetoric centered on security, stability, and survival eliminates discourse on rights and freedoms; authoritarian, nationalist, and militarist forms of politics are becoming increasingly normalized.

This global atmosphere is transforming not only states’ foreign policies but also their domestic political regimes and identity narratives. The “Liberal World Order” frequently discussed in the 1990s and early 2000s was far from perfect and was frequently violated by the states that carried this claim (especially the United States); yet it could still offer a normative and rule-based framework in terms of global politics and international order. Particularly with the progressive weakening of the international order constructed around liberal values in recent decades, rhetoric about “strong states,” “hard leadership,” and “national interest” has resurged. Within this framework, individual and collective freedoms, human rights, minority rights, and democratic institutions are eroding and increasingly giving way to “securitized” rhetoric and practices. While initiatives toward disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation came to the fore toward the end of the twentieth century, today it is clear that we are in an era of new national militarization, the strengthening of defense industries, and nuclear threats, even encompassing the European Union. In this context, the concept of “security” today no longer functions merely as a military matter; rather, it serves as a fundamental tool through which political legitimacy and social consent are produced. This is why security increasingly transforms into a political logic that substitutes democracy.

Turkey is certainly not a passive observer of this age of uncertainty. On the contrary, it is one of the countries where the impacts of global transformations are felt most harshly. A foreign policy approach that for much of the Republic focused on protecting borders and was comparatively cautious and Western-oriented has gradually evolved since the 2000s into a more ideological, interventionist, and military trajectory. Permanent military presence in Syria, direct intervention in Libya, military support in the Karabakh war, and military engagement in Somalia demonstrate that it is not only Turkey’s foreign policy tools but also the state’s identity itself that has been redefined. In this transformation, international system fractures are no less influential than the ruling power’s “Century of Turkey ” vision in global and regional power competition.

While this new foreign policy approach aspires to position Turkey as a regional power, it simultaneously produces serious risks and costs. The expansion of military capacity and advancements in the defense industry frequently displace political and diplomatic openings. As diplomacy increasingly becomes an instrument backed by military force, foreign policy decisions are justified in domestic politics through nationalist and securitized rhetoric.

Yet at the center of this grand transformation lies a fundamental problem that has remained unsolved since the Republic’s foundation: the “Kurdish question.” Turkey’s internal peace, its democratization trajectory, and its relations with the external world have for roughly a hundred years been shaped largely around this issue. From the early days of the Republic, Kurds were positioned by the state as a security and survival problem continuously reproduced in Turkish foreign policy. The trauma of partition anchored in the Treaty of Sèvres, combined with the existence of Kurds beyond borders, has transformed the Kurdish question into an ontological issue determining both domestic and foreign policy for Turkey.

Persistent State Logic: Security, Identity, and Survival

Looking at the Republic’s hundred-year history, a strong continuity is evident in its approach to the Kurdish question. The “Sèvres trauma” that shaped state logic and its accompanying survival politics have led to Kurdish demands being perceived largely not as political and democratic claims but as threats to the state’s existence. This securitized paradigm has pushed the Kurdish question outside ordinary politics, thereby producing a permanent state of exception. Consequently, Kurdish identity, language, and culture have been encoded not as elements that ought to be recognized in public space but as risks that need to be controlled and suppressed.

This approach is closely related to an ontological security understanding in which the state perceives its own existence and identity as under threat. Rather than resolving the Kurdish question, the state has preferred to continuously reproduce it, thereby reinforcing its own existence narrative. This has transformed the Kurdish question from a problem to be solved into a permanent crisis to be managed.

This paradigm has not only limited domestic politics but also constrained Turkey’s regional vision. The existence of Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Iran has created a persistent security concern that extends beyond borders for Turkey. Thus,the Kurdish question has shifted into a recurring threat perception at the center of Turkey’s Middle East policies. This perception has often resulted in military reflexes taking precedence over cooperation and diplomacy in Turkey’s relations with its neighbors.

From a longer perspective, the exceptional period in which this rigid paradigm was partly shaken was the peace process carried out between 2013-2015. For the first time, the Kurdish question was attempted to be addressed through negotiation and politics, going beyond military methods. This process was one of the rare moments when the state recognized Kurdish identity as a political interlocutor rather than as a peace threat.

The solution process not only created relative normalization within Turkey; it also positively affected Turkey’s image on the international stage. The revival of relations with the European Union, increased democratization expectations, and Turkey beginning to be mentioned again as a “model country” were notable results of this period. This experience clearly demonstrated that a democratic resolution of the Kurdish question could be a strategic gain for Turkey, not a weakness.

However, with the peace process ending after 2015, the securitized paradigm rapidly returned. Particularly the emergence of new Kurdish autonomy possibilities in northern Syria following the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and the Rojava experiment generated strong existential threat perceptions in state logic. This fracture dragged Turkey into a harsher and more costly trajectory in both domestic and foreign policy.

The deep rupture in Turkey-US relations after 2015 is one of the most visible examples of the foreign policy costs of the unresolved Kurdish question. The United States’ strategic partnership with the YPG in northeastern Syria was not perceived by Ankara as a tactical disagreement but as a direct threat to national security. This perception seriously undermined Turkey’s confidence in the US and the broader Western alliance.

The subsequent S-400 crisis, Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program, the Pastor Brunson tension, and CAATSA sanctions demonstrated how the unresolved nature of the Kurdish question produces cascading foreign policy crises. In this process, the fact that even Turkey’s NATO membership began to be questioned in Western public discourse was striking in showing the scope of the issue.

The unresolved nature of the Kurdish question creates profound effects not only in foreign policy but also in economic and political spheres. Continuous securitization leads to resources being directed toward military and security domains while social policies and democratic reforms are pushed to the background. In this context, the Kurdish question is closely linked to economic vulnerabilities in Turkey. Rising risk perception, when combined with foreign policy crises, produces exponentially increasing economic costs. Thus, the securitized paradigm creates a self-reinforcing vicious circle.

After 2024: Fragile Normalization, Deep Uncertainty

One of the most striking reflections of the current age of global uncertainty and disorder in the Middle East has been the regional convulsion following Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. This process was followed by the direct conflict between Israel and Iran that occurred in June 2025 and was publicly called the “12-Day War.” These developments have further destabilized already fragile power balances in the Middle East, bringing with them a new phase of chaos and uncertainty. In the same period, the de facto end of the Assad regime in Syria has led to a serious weakening of Iran’s regional influence and the dissolution of the long-discussed “Shia Crescent” narrative. In its place, one can speak of a transition period where Gulf states, the US, and Turkey are investing in new Sunni-axis actors they view as more manageable. In this context, the international support and political credit extended to the new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa is noteworthy.

This regional restructuring process directly intersected with domestic political developments in Turkey after October 2024. With MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s surprising public gestures, a new dialogue channel was opened between Abdullah Öcalan and Ankara. This new process advanced to the PKK’s announcement in July 2025 that it had laid down arms and dissolved itself. However, compared to the 2013-2015 solution process, this development did not generate similar waves of excitement and hope among the Kurdish population. Rather, the prevailing attitude was “cautious optimism.” The fundamental reason for this is the uncertainty surrounding the future of Rojava. The most critical pressure point of the new process is the question of Rojava’s status and what stance Ankara’s supported Sharaa administration will adopt toward Kurds. In this framework, the failure to implement and the stalling of the agreement signed between SDF leader Mazlum Abdi and the Sharaa administration on March 10, 2025 has further deepened Kurdish concerns. The suspension of the agreement has not only created military and administrative uncertainty; it has also brought with it serious question marks about whether Kurds will be recognized as subjects in the new regional order.

Indeed, the escalation of attacks against Kurds following the January 6, 2026 clashes that began in Aleppo, combined with suffered diplomatic and military losses, clearly produced marked disappointment and emotional disconnection in the Kurdish population. These developments have also demonstrated that Kurds are facing increasing international isolation and security problems in the age of global uncertainty. Yet despite all these negative circumstances, unity and solidarity practices among Kurds transcending party and factional lines have notably strengthened both in the Middle East and in Europe. This “meta-political” unity search has reinforced the claim of Kurds as not merely passive security objects but active subjects in regional politics.

This situation revealed an important reality once again for regional states: attempting to suppress the Kurdish question through purely military methods produces much greater political and social risks in the medium and long term. Particularly for Turkey, it has become increasingly clear that developments that could undermine Kurdish dignity and status at the regional level have the potential to create new vulnerabilities in domestic politics. This is why the post-2024 process, while fragile and filled with uncertainties, nonetheless carries the character of a critical threshold that once again makes visible the serious risks of managing the Kurdish question through security reflexes. In this context, Kurdish freedoms as well as their physical and human security fall under the responsibility of both Kurdish political actors and regional states. Win-win strategies must emerge within this framework.

Conclusion: The Cost of Non-Resolution, The Possibility of Resolution

This entire tableau clearly demonstrates that the unresolved nature of the Kurdish question produces increasingly mounting costs for Turkey. In a disorderly, rule-less, and multipolar international system, this non-resolution is pushing Turkey toward internal democratic regression and more costly practices externally. Yet both Kurds and Turkey clearly need mutually beneficial strategies. A democratic resolution of the Kurdish question both domestically and externally is not a weakness for Turkey; rather, it stands as one of the most important keys to being a strong, legitimate, and predictable actor in the age of global uncertainty.

/// Note: The analyses published on KSC’s website reflect the authors’ own views. These views are not necessarily aligned with KSC’s institutional approach.

Serhun Al is a political scientist specializing in nationalism, identity, Kurdish politics, and Middle East policies. Serving as faculty at the Political Science and International Relations Department of Izmir University of Economics, Assoc. Prof. Al conducts research on Turkey’s foreign policy, the transformation of state identity, and the regional dynamics of the Kurdish question. His assessments focusing on regional crises, ontological security, and the search for democratic solutions appear in numerous academic and non-academic venues.